Books As Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly Prejudicial Character Evidence by Varnado, Paul
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 31 Access to Justice: The Promise and Pitfalls of Social Problem Solving through the 
Courts and Legal Academy 
January 2009 
Books As Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly Prejudicial 
Character Evidence 
Paul Varnado 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Varnado, Books As Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly Prejudicial Character Evidence, 31 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 257 (2009), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
257 
Books as Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly 
Prejudicial Character Evidence 
Paul Varnado  
INTRODUCTION 
Individuals from diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds 
seem to share a desire to keep private the details of their personal 
thoughts and the most intimate aspects of their self-identities. But 
general claims of a right to privacy often fail to gain traction in our 
legal system, largely because ―privacy‖ is so difficult to define.1 
Courts are particularly unresponsive to privacy concerns about the 
sanctity of a criminal defendant‘s reading history, including web 
browsing and other cognitive endeavors, and broadly admit evidence 
of these mental processes. When reading histories will likely offend 
jurors‘ moral sensibilities, they become effective but often unfairly 
prejudicial prosecutorial weapons to be pointed at defendants.  
 
  J.D. (2009), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A. (2006), Public 
Policy Studies, Duke University. I would like to thank Professors Neil Richards, Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff, and Samuel Buell for their inspiration and guidance in topic development 
and research planning. I would also like to thank my fellow editors and the staff of the 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for their hard work and dedication to this 
publication.  
 1. As the concept of privacy has evolved in American law: 
[C]ommentators and scholars of the twentieth century have invoked a barrage of 
philosophy, sociology, theology and anthropology to devise definitions which are 
endlessly varied, creative and elaborate. . . . 
 . . . With the zeal of astronomers seeking to name a previously evasive star in the 
constellation, legal theoreticians walking in the footsteps of Warren and Brandeis have 
searched mightily for a single definition, a satisfying string of words, to pin down 
privacy on the revolving map of jurisprudence, in order to give it certainty of location 
and a degree of predictability. 
Ken Gromley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (1992) 
(footnotes omitted). See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE MEANINGS OF PRIVACY (2007); DECKLE 
MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 3–6 (1995). 
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The admission of such private cognitive evidence in criminal trials 
goes largely unnoticed by legal scholars because appellate courts 
bestow almost unbridled discretion on trial judges to interpret the 
evidentiary rules of relevance and prejudice. However, one recent 
case brings the problem to light. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently set a troubling precedent in Curtin v. 
United States
2
 by allowing evidence that the defendant possessed 
incestuous and pedophilic pornographic reading material to be 
admitted in an unrelated criminal prosecution for traveling across 
state lines with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor.
3
 The 
unpleasant fact pattern in Curtin is indicative of a recurring 
discrepancy: reading history almost always is used against defendants 
charged with stigmatized crimes to bias fact-finders by shocking 
 
 2. 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) 
 3. See id. at 937. The 42 year-old Curtin allegedly had engaged in Internet conversations 
in 2004 with a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Detective posing as a 14 year-old 
girl. Id. After chatting for several hours, Curtin arranged to meet the fictitious minor at a Las 
Vegas bowling alley and detailed explicitly his plans to engage in various sexual activities with 
her in his hotel room that same evening. Id. at 937–38. At the same bowling alley several days 
later, Curtin approached an undercover female police officer dressed as the fictitious minor. 
When confronted by other officers, Curtin surrendered his personal digital assistant (―PDA‖), 
which later was discovered to contain the text of more than 140 pornographic stories of incest, 
mostly involving fictitious minors. Curtin was charged with one count of traveling with the 
intent to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and one 
count of coercion and enticement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Id. Evidence of the 
stories was admitted at trial and used against Curtin, where the only disputed issue was his 
subjective intent to engage in sexual acts with a minor. Id. at 939.  
 In his defense, Curtin admitted to the instant message conversations and to traveling to the 
designated Las Vegas meeting point, but asserted that he never intended to engage in a sexual 
act with a minor. Id. at 938. Rather, he insisted that he assumed that the conversations had been 
with a consenting adult female who was masquerading as a teenaged female. Id. The jury 
rejected Curtin‘s role-playing defense and convicted him. Id. at 937. On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit held: 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the stories in 
Curtin‘s PDA in his possession at the time of his arrest contained relevant evidence 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) insofar as they related to sexual acts between adults and 
minors. This evidence in this case had probative value with respect to the intent 
element of the specific intent crime for which he was prosecuted. 
Curtin, 489 F.3d at 959. The Ninth Circuit further held that ―[t]he nature of the defense 
heightened the probative value of the stories because they not only tended to prove Curtin‘s 
intent, but to demonstrate also that his aggressive defense was not credible. Thus, the evidence 
was probative both of Curtin‘s intent and the credibility of his innocence defense.‖ Id. at 950. 
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them with perversity or obscenity in ways that mainstream reading 
material never would be construed.
4
 
The interests at stake in protecting reading history from scrutiny 
are vitally important, and protecting them would achieve much more 
than simply ensuring that the goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
are implemented consistently. Shielding reading histories also would 
uphold the constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of 
thought, and freedom from overbroad government searches into one‘s 
private affairs. Further, shielding reading histories would ensure that 
the criminal justice system facilitates accurate jury decision-making 
processes. An examination of the limits and scope of individualized 
cognitive evidence is particularly timely given the emerging 
techniques by which state and private entities obtain records of 
intellectual activity. 
This Note argues that reading histories should be barred as a 
matter of law from the criminal trial context because admission of 
such evidence unfairly prejudices
5
 a defendant in the eyes of a 
rational fact-finder. Part I of this Note surveys the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and historical federal and state judicial precedents related to 
the admissibility of evidence of criminal defendants‘ reading 
material, as well as modern trends of increasing surveillance of 
intellectual activity. Part I also examines the constitutional 
implications of using such evidence against defendants in the context 
of intellectual freedom implied by the First Amendment and the right 
to privacy bestowed by the Fourth Amendment. Part II examines 
scholarly material on how fact-finders, particularly juries, interpret 
character evidence and how judges‘ limiting instructions are counter-
productive.  
Parts III and IV of this Note analyze the harms of the current trend 
and propose an explicit amendment or comment to the rules 
prohibiting admission of reading history evidence. Given the threat to 
fair administration of justice posed by judges‘ allowance of unfairly 
 
 4. The California Court of Appeals warned against prejudicial use of reading-history 
evidence by making a shrewd comparison: ―We start down a wavering path when we begin to 
judge people‘s actions by the content of the literature they keep about them. Had Shakespeare 
been charged with regicide, we doubt Macbeth would be admissible evidence.‖ People v. Scott, 
No. A088396, 2001 WL 1663224, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 5. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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prejudicial evidence regarding reading history, viewing history, and 
other cognitive evidence, the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence should explicitly bar such evidence from 
admission in criminal trials. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORY 
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
establish broad principles
6
 applicable to trials in federal courts.
7
 The 
Federal Rules favor admissibility, giving finders of fact wide latitude 
to determine which factors are to be considered and how much 
weight to assign to each fact or theory. Rule 401 defines ‗relevant 
evidence‘ broadly.8 Rule 402 provides a baseline: relevant evidence 
is generally, but not always, admissible, whereas irrelevant evidence 
never is admissible.
9
 Rule 403 serves as a safety valve for the breadth 
conferred by Rule 401, excluding otherwise relevant evidence where 
its admission could taint the outcome of the trial. Where the probative 
value of the evidence would be outweighed by the danger of bias 
because of ―unfair prejudice‖,10 Rule 403 serves as a check on the 
 
 6. The Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated for the purpose of ―secur[ing] 
fairness in administration . . . of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained 
and proceeding justly determined.‖ FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 7. State high courts largely have adopted language from the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as the governing principles for trials in their tribunals. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH ET AL., 
EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 13.2 (1994). For example, most 
states have adopted a rule of evidence that is nearly identical to Federal Rule 403. Id.  
 8. FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 401 makes relevant ―evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖ FED. R. EVID. 401. The Supreme Court 
recently took note of the Rule‘s breadth, noting that ―[r]elevance and prejudice under Rules 401 
and 403 are determined in the context of the facts and arguments in a particular case, and thus 
are generally not amenable to broad per se rules.‖ Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 
S. Ct. 1140, 1147 (2008). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule 402 reads: ―All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, 
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible.‖ Id. The Note accompanying Rule 402 explains that 
evidence is excluded from trial despite its relevancy in many contexts in response to the 
demands of public policy. FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee‘s note. 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 reads: ―Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
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ever-present threat that rational decision-making will fall victim to 
the passions and sympathies of the decision-maker.
11
 Legal 
commentators conceived of ―unfair prejudice‖ under Rule 403 as 
―inferential error‖12 that is ―excludable when it is admitted or 
communicated through the use of psychological tactics that cause the 
jury to incorrectly ascribe value or ascribe more or less value to that 
evidence.‖13 
Admissibility and court treatment of evidence of a defendant‘s 
prior non-criminal acts, including reading history, largely turns on 
Rule 404.
14
 The rule bars evidence of other crimes or acts when they 
are offered simply to establish or imply the character of the defendant 
as circumstantial proof of the defendant‘s conduct in the present 
case.
15
 The advisory comment accompanying Rule 404 notes 
 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.‖ Id. 
 11. ―‗Unfair prejudice‘ within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on 
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.‖ FED. R. EVID. 403 
advisory committee‘s note. 
 12. See Victor Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of 
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 506 (1983) (―Inferential error occurs 
when the jury incorrectly decides that evidence is probative of an alleged fact or event.‖).  
 13. Michelle Pan, Strategy or Strategem: The Use of Improper Psychological Tactics by 
Trial Attorneys to Persuade Jurors, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 259, 275 (2005). 
 14. Rule 404(b) reads:  
 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that 
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice 
on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 15. Rule 404(b) is particularly difficult for courts to apply because it governs admissibility 
when a given piece of evidence is both legitimate and illegitimate, or tends to prove an element 
of the crime, where such element is evidence of character. ―No mechanical solution is offered. 
The determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other 
facts appropriate for making decision of this kind under 403.‖ FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory 
committee‘s note. 
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explicitly that character evidence tends to distract from probatively 
valuable evidence.
16
  
Appellate courts have applied the Federal Rules of Evidence using 
ad hoc balancing tests
17
 given the facts of each case. The courts fail, 
however, to engage in broader analysis, which has led to an 
incoherent definition of unfair prejudice.
18
 Appellate courts 
consistently have affirmed convictions despite prejudicial or 
irrelevant
19
 evidence, deeming the admissions ―harmless errors.‖20  
The prosecutorial power resulting from the ad hoc system of 
screening defendants‘ reading and viewing history evidence for 
unfair prejudice was bolstered by the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
 
 16. The Advisory Committee warned:  
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to 
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the 
particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man to punish 
the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the 
case shows actually happened.  
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee‘s note (citation omitted). 
 17. Application of the balancing test depends largely on the circumstances of the 
particular trial, including views of the judge in assessing probative value and prejudicial effect, 
as well as the amount of other evidence proffered. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN‘S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02[2][a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 
2000). 
 18. See Gold, supra note 12, at 498. 
 19. See Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the 
Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 
540–42 (2004). Professor Nicolas notes that de novo review of a relevancy determination is 
appropriate where the dispute involves the materiality prong of relevance, but that a more 
deferential review of the probative worth prong makes sense, especially when a balancing of 
prejudice under Rule 403 also is involved. Id. 
 20. See United States v. Holt, 170 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming a conviction 
despite finding error in trial court‘s allowance of the government‘s repeated references to the 
Anarchist‘s Cookbook, which described how to make explosives, entirely unrelated to the main 
issue regarding guns). The government argued that sale of the book in Defendant‘s store 
reflected his lack of ―law abidingness.‖ Id. at 701. The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed 
a first-degree murder conviction where the state told the jury in its opening statement that 
―evidence would show that Defendant liked the film, Natural Born Killers, had seen it 
numerous times, and had announced his desire to ‗pull a fatality.‘‖ State v. Begay, 964 P.2d 
102, 106 (N.M. 1998). The court held that ―a cautionary instruction given to the jury effectively 
eliminated any possible prejudice that might have resulted from the prosecutor‘s and judge‘s 
remarks.‖ Id. at 107. The Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the admission of ―death metal‖ 
musical evidence to show motive—such music purportedly showed that the crimes were ―more 
than simply a robbery gone awry.‖ State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667, 674–75 (Or. 1998). 
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Old Chief v. United States.
21
 The Court in Old Chief advanced the 
proposition that trial judges have complete discretion regarding the 
admission of evidence sought to be excluded under rule 403.
22
 Absent 
an explicit directive from the Federal Rules of Evidence, habit 
character evidence about reading materials will continue to influence 
fact-finders to the detriment of defendants. 
B. Fourth Amendment 
Under the Fourth Amendment,
23
 reading-material evidence often 
runs afoul of the Constitution before an arrest is ever made. Law 
enforcement personnel regularly search for and seize this kind of 
evidence despite the explicit requirement that a search or seizure be 
narrowly limited in scope before it begins.
24
 One reason for such a 
seizure is that during the execution of a sufficiently particular and 
legally obtained warrant, an officer may seize anything suspicious in 
―plain view‖ even if that evidence is not described in the warrant.25 
 
 21. 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 22. The Court in Old Chief stated that the standard of review applicable to evidentiary 
rulings of district courts is ―abuse of discretion.‖ Id. at 174 n.1 (citing United States v. Abel, 
469 U.S. 45, 54–55 (1984)). This is ―a standard that is not satisfied by a mere showing of some 
alternative means of proof that the prosecution in its broad discretion chose not to rely upon.‖ 
Id. at 183 n.7. See also Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 1144–45 
(explaining that wide appellate discretion afforded to evidentiary rulings, particularly with 
respect to Rule 403, is in deference to district courts‘ familiarity with factual details of cases). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment requires that: 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 24. See id. The Supreme Court has a long tradition of strictly interpreting the particularity 
requirement, allowing for no discretion on the part of the officer executing the warrant as to 
what may be taken. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). The scope of the 
search must be ‗strictly tied to and justified by‘ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).  
 25. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–71 (1971). However, it is 
important to note that ―a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth 
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.‖ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 
(1968) (citations omitted). See also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356–
58 (1931) (enjoining the district court from using business papers as criminal evidence where 
officers‘ warrant did not mention the company). The Fourth Amendment ―prevents the issue of 
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Where a search implicates possible First Amendment concerns, 
the Supreme Court has strengthened Fourth Amendment protections 
by requiring warrants to meet the high standard of ―most scrupulous 
exactitude.‖26 To this end, the Court has expressed concern over the 
possible exclusion of lawful communication from the marketplace of 
ideas
27
 if sweeping searches are allowed.
28
  
C. First Amendment 
Courts and legal scholars long have recognized that the First 
Amendment restricts the admissibility of evidence related to a 
criminal defendant‘s core political speech or association.29 However, 
 
warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against 
all general searches. Since before the creation of our government, such searches have been 
deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.‖ Id. at 357. 
 26. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. 547, 564 (1970); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1061 (Colo. 
2002) (restraining law enforcement officers from executing warrant for suspect‘s bookstore 
records where the need for evidence was not compelling enough to outweigh chilling effect on 
free speech). The same heightened standard applies, beyond warrant execution, to judicial 
evaluation of the legality of a search where expressive material is involved. See, e.g., Roaden v. 
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501–03 (1973); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 
205, 211–12 (1964).  
 27. The metaphor of a ―marketplace of ideas‖ often is attributed to Justice Holmes‘s 
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Though he never used the phrase 
as such, Justice Holmes stated that ―the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas.‖ Id. 
 28. Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Appellants were distributors of 
magazines, newspapers, and books. Id. at 722. A warrant was issued authorizing officers to 
search appellants‘ premises and seize all ―obscene‖ material. Id. After hasty examination, 
officers seized all copies of all publications that, in their judgment, were obscene. Id. at 722–23. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained: 
In consequence there were suppressed and withheld from the market for over two 
months 180 publications not found obscene. The fact that only one-third of the 
publications seized were finally condemned strengthens the conclusion that discretion 
to seize allegedly obscene materials cannot be confided to law enforcement officials 
without greater safeguards than were here operative. Procedures which sweep so 
broadly and with so little discrimination are obviously deficient in techniques required 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent erosion of the 
constitutional guarantees.  
Id. at 732–33 (footnotes omitted). The Court invalidated the search under the scrupulous 
exactitude standard because police ―were provided with no guide to the exercise of informed 
discretion, because there was no step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus 
searchingly on the question of [illegality of the material].‖ Id. at 732.  
 29. It is questionable whether the traditional balancing test for admissibility of potentially 
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the corresponding First Amendment right to receive information 
often is overlooked, despite support for it in Supreme Court 
precedent.
30
  
Admission of reading-history evidence threatens to chill others 
from later receiving protected communication by making private 
thoughts and beliefs public.
31
 Such erosion of our ―robust culture of 
expression‖32 substantially threatens defendants‘ First Amendment 
rights.
33
 Publication of books or electronic stories should not be 
viewed as a one-way endeavor, because the freedom to publish books 
or stories necessarily works in symbiosis with the freedom to read 
them. When readers are exposed to new information or ideas, they 
can become more dynamic barterers in the marketplace of ideas.
34
 
While the pornographic reading material in Curtin was deplorable by 
contemporary societal standards, the stories themselves 
presumptively were protected by the First Amendment.
35
 They likely 
 
unfairly prejudicial evidence, given minimal appellate review, satisfies the imperatives of the 
First Amendment. See Peter E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction 
of Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1641 (1977) 
(arguing courts must take ―prophylactic‖ measures with the special strictness normally afforded 
to procedural guarantees when First Amendment rights are at stake).  
 30. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1964) (holding mail addressee‘s First 
Amendment rights were infringed by opt-in requirement for Communist literature); Martin v. 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (holding pedestrians have right to receive spoken information 
from Jehovah‘s Witness); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (holding protestors have 
right to receive spoken information from labor organizer).  
 31. The Supreme Court has recognized that a critical part of protecting First Amendment 
rights is protecting the right to individual anonymity during the exchange of ideas. Justice 
Stevens provided a strong metaphor: ―Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It 
. . . exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: 
to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the 
hand of an intolerant society.‖ McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm‘n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). 
 32. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Texas L. Rev. 387, 407 (2008).  
 33. The principal theories of the First Amendment—the search for truth and self-
governance rationales—both have their roots in freedom of thought. Id. at 396–98. Formulating 
future speech or writing requires ―the ability . . . to develop ideas and beliefs away from the 
unwanted gaze or interference of others.‖ Id. at 389. 
 34. The right to receive information is a well-established corollary of free speech under 
the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the 
Communications Decency Act unacceptably burdens citizens‘ constitutional right to receive 
speech and to address one another); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (explaining 
that the First Amendment right to receive ideas ―follows ineluctably from the sender’s . . . right 
to send them‖ and is ―a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own 
rights of speech, press, and political freedom‖). 
 35. Depictions of sexual contact with children, such as the text in Curtin‘s PDA, or 
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were non-obscene
36
 and exempt from prior government restraint or 
seizure.
37
  
D. Appellate Court Precedent 
In most criminal trial contexts,
38
 the circuit courts of appeals are 
split on the standards for admitting character evidence. Before Curtin 
v. United States,
39
 the Ninth Circuit uniformly excluded otherwise 
legal reading material from evidence at criminal trials where such 
evidence was introduced merely to show intent.
40
  
 
―virtual‖ synthesized child pornography, are protected by the First Amendment as long as they 
do not meet the legal test for obscenity. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).  
 36. The prosecutors in Curtin did not argue that the text files legally were obscene. In 
United States v. Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court enumerated a three factor test for 
obscenity. Reviewing courts are to inquire whether:  
[T]he average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that 
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).  
 37. Even possession of obscene speech receives significant protection against government 
suppression and seizure. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that a statute 
making mere private possession of obscene material a crime, on the grounds that it may lead to 
antisocial conduct, is repugnant to the First Amendment); cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 
(1982) (images of child sexual abuse are unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 38. The Federal Rules of Evidence make an explicit exception to the ban on character 
evidence to allow such evidence in crimes of sexual assault: ―In a criminal case in which the 
defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant‘s commission of 
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its 
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.‖ FED. R. EVID. 413(a). See also FED. R. EVID. 
414(a) (same for offense of child molestation); FED. R. EVID. 415 (same for civil actions for 
sexual assault of child molestation). 
 39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 40. ―While certain types of conduct generally condemned by society may constitute bad 
acts, possession of lawful reading material is simply not the type of conduct contemplated by 
Rule 404(b).‖ Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States 
v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1484–85 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Ninth Circuit held that a district court 
improperly allowed a prosecutor to admit homosexual pornography as evidence that a 
defendant was aroused by alleged criminal contact with minor males. ―Whether Shymanovitz‘s 
actual purpose in touching the alleged victims was sexual arousal or gratification, however, or 
whether he was actually aroused or gratified by the touching is immaterial to the offenses, 
including the charges based on improper sexual contact.‖ Id. at 1158. 
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In United States v. Brand,
41
 the Second Circuit took a similar 
position to the Curtin court and affirmed the admission of evidence 
that the defendant possessed child pornography to show an alleged 
predisposition to commit child molestation.
42
  
The Seventh Circuit allowed similar evidence where the state 
affirmatively advanced a claim that the past acts directly relate to an 
element of the crime at issue.
43
 The Supreme Court, in Huddleston v. 
United States,
44
 gave limited recognition to the notion that past-act 
evidence has probative value on mens rea, allowing it only when 
more direct evidence is lacking or otherwise unavailable.
45
  
State and federal courts generally recognize that evidence of 
homosexual orientation is highly prejudicial and has no probative 
value for proving either action
46
 or intent
47
 crimes. This is quite 
inconsistent with the outcome in obscenity cases like Curtin, where 
courts all too often are more than willing to admit evidence that is 
similarly repugnant to societal norms and values.
48
  
 
 41. 467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 42. Child pornography images were admitted against the objections of a defendant 
charged with traveling in interstate commerce and enticing a minor to engage in illicit sexual 
conduct. Id. at 206–07. The court reasoned that the images showed the defendant‘s intent to 
entice an undercover agent posing as a 13 year-old girl in an Internet chat room to meet him. Id. 
at 197. The court‘s reasoning depended on the inference that the images demonstrated the 
defendant‘s sexual interest in children, and that the defendant‘s purposes in traveling therefore 
included sexual activity with children. Id. at 199–201. 
 43. ―The fact that [the defendant] maintained a collection of videos and pictures depicting 
intentional violence is probative of the State‘s claim that he had an obsession with that subject. 
A person obsessed with violence is more likely to commit murder, and therefore the videos and 
photographs are relevant.‖ Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted). 
 44. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
 45. ―Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a 
disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the actor‘s state of mind and the only means 
of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from conduct.‖ Id. at 685. 
 46. See State v. Lee, 525 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Neb. 1994) (evidence of defendant‘s 
possession of homosexual pornography is irrelevant to charge of child rape); State v. Tizard, 
897 S.W.2d 732, 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (evidence of defendant‘s possession of 
homosexual pornography is irrelevant to charges of sexual battery). 
 47. See United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir. 1988) (―Evidence of 
homosexuality is extremely prejudicial‖ to jury determination of intent to import a minor alien 
for immoral purposes.).  
 48. For example, a Ninth Circuit decision concluded that the introduction of evidence of 
homosexuality creates a ―clear potential that the jury may have been unfairly influenced by 
whatever biases and stereotypes they might hold with regard to homosexuals . . . .‖ Cohn v. 
Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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E. Availability of Reading History Data 
Trial judges‘ willingness to admit unfairly prejudicial evidence of 
a defendant‘s reading or viewing history is particularly pertinent 
given several recent, disturbing trends. Vast quantities of personal 
consumption records are available for purchase by criminal 
prosecutors and other government officials due to the development of 
sophisticated private databases.
49
 In United States v. Miller
50
 the 
Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in most transactional records maintained by third parties.
51
 Though 
Miller was decided thirty-two years ago, only within the past decade 
have criminal investigators begun to use purchase histories as 
evidence of reading habits.
52
 Though in 2007 retail giant 
Amazon.com successfully challenged an exceptionally broad 
subpoena,
53
 reading transactions still are accessible freely whenever 
 
 49. Several large commercial brokers collect data on a variety of transactions that 
Americans conduct. Some brokers, including ChoicePoint, Inc., actually tailor data compilation 
for purchase by law enforcement agencies. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: 
How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect Your Data for Law 
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 595, 596 (2004). For further discussion of data 
flow from the private sector to government investigators, see Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers 
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095–1101 
(2002). 
 50. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
 51. Id. 
 52. The first well-known attempt to use a book purchase as criminal evidence came 
during the Monica Lewinsky scandal, when the special prosecutor, Kenneth Starr, subpoenaed 
the records of a Washington bookstore to determine if Ms. Lewinsky had bought a novel about 
phone sex. Felicity Barringer, Ideas and Trends; Using Books as Evidence Against Their 
Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at wk3. Christopher Finan, president of the American 
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, theorized that, beginning early in this decade, 
police increasingly were shortcutting the investigative process by snooping into a suspect‘s 
bookstore records due to the publicity of this technique in the wake of the Lewinsky scandal. Id. 
This trend has arisen despite the United States District Court for the District of Columbia‘s 
ruling that ―the bookstores and Ms. Lewinsky had persuasively alleged a chilling effect on their 
First Amendment rights.‖ In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc., 26 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1599, 1600 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 53. Federal prosecutors sought 24,000 customers‘ book purchase records as part of an 
investigation of fraudulent bookselling by a Madison, Wisconsin, city official. John Diedrich, 
Online Book Records Kept Private: U.S. Attorney Sought Amazon.com Buyer List in Fraud 
Case, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 2007, at B. The magistrate noted that while the 
Supreme Court has ―never directly imposed a higher standard for reviewing grand jury 
subpoenas that implicate First Amendment concerns, the Court has implied that lower courts 
should be mindful of any non-speculative First Amendment concerns.‖ In Re Grand Jury 
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booksellers, large and small, are intimidated by police or simply opt 
to help catch a criminal. 
The congressional reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
further eroded privacy rights to intellectual transactional data. Under 
the USA PATRIOT Act, government officials gained unprecedented 
power to obtain materials protected by the First Amendment,
54
 
explicitly including reading histories among the sources for which the 
FBI may secure an order of production.
55
  
II. FACT-FINDERS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 
The United States Constitution
56
 expressly preserves the 
fundamental right of a criminal defendant to a trial by jury, and the 
Supreme Court has clarified the scope of the Constitution‘s 
procedural protections.
57
 Reading-history evidence uniquely 
influences decision-making in this particular context, and courts long 
have recognized the need to shield juries from inflammatory and 
over-prejudicial evidence.
58
 Since jurors lack training in legal 
 
Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246 F.R.D. 570, 572 (W.D. Wis. 2007), 
available at http://www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/bcgi-bin/opinions/district_opinions/GJ/07/07-GJ-
04-11-23-07.pdf (citing, inter alia, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).  
 54. Section 215 of the Patriot Act confers power far beyond the government‘s carefully 
constrained search warrant and subpoena powers, providing that officials can obtain materials 
whenever the government states—without a showing of relevance or necessity—that the 
materials are sought ―to protect against international terrorism.‖ 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (Supp. 
III 2003). Section 215 provides no means of challenging an order once issued and imposes an 
automatic gag order on the recipient of a request, barring the recipient from telling anyone, 
including the subject of the inquiry, about the request. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861. 
 55. Section 215 provides for production of ―library circulation records, library patron lists, 
book sales records, book customer lists.‖ 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). 
 56. The Sixth Amendment provides: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law 
. . . .‖ U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 57. The Supreme Court held that the right to jury trial in criminal cases is ―fundamental to 
the American system of justice‖ and that the right therefore is applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 58. Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, noted:  
With only the rough and ready tests supplied by their experience of life, the jurors 
were to look into the workings of another‘s mind, and discover its capacities and 
disabilities, its urges and inhibitions, in moments of intense excitement. Delicate 
enough and subtle is the inquiry, even in the most favorable conditions, with every 
warping influence excluded. There must be no blurring of the issues by evidence 
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reasoning, they are more likely than judges to reach conclusions 
based on emotional inferences, rather than provable facts.
59
 The 
introduction of character evidence
60
 is particularly troubling. The 
general prohibition of character trait evidence—intended to prove 
guilt by showing a defendant‘s propensity to commit a crime61—is 
most eroded in criminal cases where the alleged conduct involves 
activity that goes against societal norms.
62
  
The use of character evidence to induce moral judgment by jurors 
has several compelling consequences. First, allowing character 
evidence can make the jury unduly punitive toward habitual criminals 
and more likely to convict on weaker evidence.
63
 Second, evidence of 
past behavior is not a sufficiently accurate predictor of future 
dangerous or criminal conduct. Psychologists studying the variability 
of behavior across situations have raised doubts as to whether a stable 
personality exists that could allow for lay judgments of criminal 
guilt.
64
 
 
illegally admitted and carrying with it in its admission an appeal to prejudice and 
passion. 
People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 467 (N.Y. 1930). 
 59. The modern view is that prejudice is particularly problematic when juries are fact-
finders. See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(Rule 403 exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence does not apply in a bench trial).  
 60. Professor McCormick defines ―character‖ as ―a generalized description of one‘s 
disposition, or of one‘s disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or 
peacefulness.‖ CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 340 (5th ed. 
1959) (quoted in FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee‘s note).  
 61. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.  
 62. Commentators long have recognized that context matters. For example, Judge 
Weinstein and Professor Berger note that ―[i]n the trial of narcotics offenses, some courts 
display a particularly wide latitude in admitting evidence of other acts.‖ JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN‘S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.22[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin 
ed., 2d ed. 2000). Also, the Federal Rules of Evidence make an explicit exception to allow 
character evidence in sex crime cases. See FED. R. EVID. 413–15.  
 63. One economic model evaluating juror incentives for leniency concluded that habitual 
criminals are more likely than first-time offenders to be convicted by a jury—even where the 
jury believes the defendant probably is not guilty of the crime at hand—to compensate for 
perceived unpunished past transgressions. See Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and 
Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 323 
(1994). The authors conclude that juries typically will ―support[] the prevailing public 
sentiment on crime, which holds that the criminal justice system should be more punitive 
toward habitual criminals.‖ Id. at 340. 
 64. See Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 
45 EMORY L.J. 221 (1996). Mendez argues that, at present, the weight of psychological theory 
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Furthermore, jurors are likely to interpret evidence using a 
simplistic ―story model‖ to process information and determine guilt.65 
As cable news and other media exploit the sensational narrative of 
violent crime, it becomes increasingly plausible that the legal system 
will respond in turn, eroding or even eliminating altogether the 
character evidence prohibition. Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence allowing character evidence in sexual misconduct or child 
molestation cases show that the trend is toward more liberal 
admission requirements.
66
  
Trials are only partially about making factual determinations of 
past occurrences. Trials also are an important part of the state‘s 
regulation of behavior in society—a forum for making and enforcing 
value judgments that are rooted not only in objective fairness but also 
in morality and traditional conformity. This is particularly true of 
trials by jury.
67
 Understanding trials in this broader context reveals a 
clearer, more robust rationale for limits on admissibility of personal 
evidence. If potential lawbreakers were rational, they would weigh 
the disincentives of criminal penalties for their actions. While most 
are unfamiliar with the Federal Rules of Evidence, prospective 
 
supports the proposition that the basic personality structure is stable, with stable patterns of 
variability. However, jurors are not equipped to make predictions about guilt, which ―would 
have to be supplied by a qualified expert who has administered appropriate personality tests to 
the defendant.‖ Id. at 236. Given the infeasibility of requiring such personality tests, 
psychologists‘ belief in a stable personality system does not justify repealing the ban on 
character evidence.  
 65. Jurors tend to create a narrative summary of the events under dispute, interpreting 
evidence and deciding how to vote by choosing the best-fitting verdict category for a resolution. 
Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’ Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 995 (2001). Some scholars 
have advocated the incorporation of rules to ameliorate the potential accuracy-reducing effects 
of the story model. See Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story 
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 572–73 (1991). 
 66. FED. R. EVID. 413–15. See supra notes 38 and 62; see also David P. Leonard, In 
Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by 
Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161 (1998). ―There is no question that it is the beginning of an 
experiment . . . to see whether, as a general proposition, we should just abolish the bar 
altogether.‖ Id. at 1163 n.9 (citing Richard C. Reuben, Some Judges Oppose Evidence 
Amendment, 81 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (1995) (omission in original)).  
 67. The trial by jury system implements on behavior outside of the courtroom what 
Professor Sanchirico calls ―primary incentives.‖ Sanchirico notes that ―character evidence . . . is 
one area in which the truth seeking approach and the primary incentives approach to trial point 
in very different directions.‖ Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of 
Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1231–32 (2001).  
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defendants still tend to understand (at least indirectly) that, should 
they be arrested, the trial system is designed to find provable facts. 
The trial system is not likely seen as one that makes sweeping 
determinations of morality by looking to past actions or personal 
beliefs.
68
 
Given the underlying social dynamics of a jury trial, judges use 
limiting instructions to temper fact-finders‘ broad discretion to weigh 
evidence that borders on being unfairly prejudicial.
69
 The Supreme 
Court has recognized both that limiting instructions can save 
otherwise inadmissible evidence,
70
 and that it is a ―naïve assumption 
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury.‖71 
Empirical studies confirm that jurors largely are unable to use 
evidence for limited purposes ―because it is all but impossible for 
 
 68. Sanchirico reinforces this seemingly tenuous relationship between knowledge of 
criminal law and knowledge of courts‘ rules of evidence: 
Admitting character evidence for conduct—while it might increase the accuracy of 
trials—attenuates the connection between actions and consequences. The population 
may not understand how the connection between actions and consequences is 
maintained in the current system, nor the particular role played by prohibiting evidence 
of character. Yet it is easy to imagine that were character evidence freely admitted, the 
resulting disjunction between actions and assigned penalties would eventually become 
apparent. 
Id. at 1263. Sanchirico concludes that the law ―allows character evidence for the secondary 
purpose of impeaching the witness who purports to offer trace evidence of primary conduct. . . . 
But, for the most part, it insulates the determination of primary conduct itself from the 
inference, reasonable as it may be, that individuals often act in conformity with identifiable 
propensities.‖ Id. at 1306. 
 69. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence maintain that a proper instruction limiting 
the use of prior convictions is sufficient to ensure the fairness of the trial process. See FED. R. 
EVID. 105. 
 70. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 74–75 (1979) (―The possible prejudice resulting 
from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court‘s instructions is not so ‗devastating‘ or 
‗vital‘ to the confessing defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission 
of evidence with limiting instructions.‖). But cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 
(1968) (―[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.‖). 
 71. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(―[A]ll practicing lawyers know [this assumption] to be unmitigated fiction.‖) (citation 
omitted). Judge Learned Hand characterized the task allocated to jurors concerning prior 
convictions as ―a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their power, but anybody‘s else 
[sic].‖ Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932). 
These criticisms continue to pervade modern legal commentary. See MCCORMICK, supra note 
60, at 91 & n.12. 
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jurors to forget evidence for one purpose while remembering it for 
another.‖72 In fact, research suggests that a judge‘s insistent tone in 
his admonishment to disregard tends to provoke a hostile reaction, 
causing jurors to rely on the admonished evidence.
73
 
Reading histories seem particularly susceptible to the flaws of 
limiting instructions, because they often are used to show deviance 
from societal norms regarding morality and decency, as exemplified 
by Curtin. Character evidence that shocks or offends jurors‘ 
sensibilities, as reading or viewing histories offered into evidence 
often do, are likely to influence heavily jurors‘ subconscious 
conclusions about overall social attractiveness.
74
 The ad hoc 
exclusionary system for reading history evidence exacerbates the 
flaws inherent in juror fact-finding. 
 
 72. Lisa Eichhorn, Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury’s Ability to Disregard 
Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 345 (1989).  
 In fact, when objections are launched to exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence, the 
objections themselves draw disproportionate juror attention to the very evidence that jurors are 
told to disregard. Eichhorn, supra, at 344. For example, the ―fuss‖ made over ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence of a defendant‘s insurance coverage in a tort case made mock jurors in 
one study infer that the evidence had particular importance, and therefore resulted in higher 
average damage awards for the plaintiff, despite silence on the topic during deliberation. Id. 
(citing Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959)). 
 73. See Joel D. Lieberman & Janie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting 
Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard 
Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 677 (2000). 
For a general discussion of reactance theory, see JACK W. BREHM & SHARON S. BREHM, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 35–36 (1981). The 
theory suggests that, because individuals resist any attempt they perceive as limiting their 
freedom of choice, a forbidden option becomes more attractive than it originally had appeared. 
Id. at 96–97. Under the current evidentiary rules, in the rare case in which a trial judge decides 
to exclude evidence of past legal acts offered by a prosecutor to show some moral flaw or 
character defect on the part of the defendant, jurors likely will be unable or unwilling to comply 
with limiting instructions.  
 74. A variety of studies have shown that mock jurors combine the variables of occupation, 
marital status, criminal history, appearance, and personality into a social attractiveness value 
judgment, which can influence outcomes heavily. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, 
Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1274–78 (1997). 
Shocking indicators of a non-traditional lifestyle, particularly in the context of sexual 
attractions, are likely to negate any chance that the average juror will feel sympathy for a 
criminal defendant. 
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III. THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT EXCLUSION RULE 
The Federal Rules of Evidence demonstrate a clear intent on the 
part of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the attorneys and legal 
scholars who helped draft them, to exclude unfairly prejudicial 
evidence. Yet prosecutors consistently slip reading histories into 
evidence to the detriment of often socially marginalized defendants. 
They do so despite the heightened protection that the Bill of Rights 
gives to communicative and cognitive freedom, and in so doing 
exploit jurors‘ tendencies to make extraneous value judgments about 
a defendant when their senses of morality are offended.  
The clear standard set by Rule 404(b), and explained in the 
comments thereto, illustrates that character evidence is particularly 
dangerous because it distracts attention from probatively valuable 
evidence.
75
 While Rule 403 already draws a bright line by calling for 
evidence to be excluded where its unfairly prejudicial effect likely 
will outweigh its probative value,
76
 trial judges have grown 
accustomed to having their evidentiary discretion go unquestioned 
during appellate review.
77
 
The Fourth Amendment protects against broad or unwarranted 
government intrusions into a suspect‘s private thoughts and activities. 
But a disconnect currently exists between this right to privacy and the 
ability of prosecutors to exploit the departure from societal norms of 
defendants‘ beliefs by embarrassing or vilifying them. The 
willingness of trial judges to admit otherwise lawful reading 
materials encourages police to ―gather dirt‖ on a suspect using the 
plain-view exception to the requirement that warranted searches of 
written material be limited with scrupulous exactitude
78—a 
requirement designed to keep lawful material within the vitally 
important marketplace of ideas. 
The First Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech implies a 
concomitant freedom to anonymously select, access, and read 
protected speech of one‘s choosing,79 no matter the medium or the 
 
 75. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra note 24. 
 79. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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apparent value of the speech to outside evaluators. Erosion of 
anonymity deters citizens from engaging in lawful communication
80
 
out of fear of the embarrassment that surveillance could bring. This 
fear is increasingly plausible given the emerging availability of 
privately aggregated consumer databases for government agencies‘ 
perusal
81
 and the lack of oversight under the USA PATRIOT Act as 
to how and when that data is acquired and used.
82
  
Evidence of a proclivity for generalized obscenity, like the 
incestuous stories in Curtin, poses the same danger of defendant 
stereotyping as does evidence of sexual orientation—jurors may draw 
character inferences from both of these traits. Courts are more willing 
to allow vilification of individuals viewed as deviant, but who do not 
fall into a more socially accepted or legally protected class like 
sexual orientation. Whether consciously or not, jurors may be more 
comfortable imputing their morality
83
 to punish a pedophilic, role-
playing, pornography consumer than to a homosexual, even though 
they may bring biases against both into the jury room.
84
 
All fact-finders are prone to actively or subconsciously integrate 
individual or community conceptions of morality, decency, or 
tradition with the evidence they receive both from prosecution and 
defense. Juries, who often make factual determinations in American 
criminal trials, tend to tackle the often-overwhelming task of 
processing evidence by developing their own narratives to explain or 
judge the thoughts and activities they attribute to a defendant.
85
 It is 
essential for the Federal Rules of Evidence to divorce such 
stereotyping narratives from decisions about criminal guilt. When 
 
 80. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 83. Guilty verdicts theoretically are value judgments against one defendant that provide 
disincentives for similar individuals outside the courtroom. See Sanchirico, supra note 67 and 
accompanying text. 
 84. Fundamentally, the use of material protected by the First Amendment as negative 
character evidence is troubling beyond just the practical effects of inconsistent and inaccurate 
administration of justice. It incorrectly implies that the trial court has the province to use the 
force of criminal penalties to deem certain instances of protected speech to be of lesser value 
than others based on content alone. For a discussion of the inaccuracy of character traits and 
past acts as bases for judgments about criminal guilt, see supra notes 64–65 and accompanying 
text. 
 85. See supra note 65. 
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juries are told that a defendant habitually read or viewed violent or 
pornographic materials, it becomes easy for jurors to infer guilt that 
they may not infer normally from a defendant‘s engagement with 
mainstream books or movies.  
Jurors may respond to their outrage or shock by punishing 
defendants for violations of societal norms, regardless of whether the 
elements of the charged crime or crimes were proved. 
Understandably, both limiting instructions and relevance objection 
arguments encourage jurors to consider problematic character 
evidence by drawing special attention to the evidence at issue.
86
 
The broad deference that decisions like Curtin grant to trial courts 
reflects a misguided faith in limiting instructions and relevance 
rulings to protect defendants. Yet the Ninth Circuit in Curtin 
completely neglected to instruct trial judges on how to mitigate the 
risks of admitting provocative reading-history evidence, or to provide 
guidelines for exclusionary rulings where such sensitive or 
embarrassing personal evidence is at issue.
87
 
A bright line rule is necessary to avoid the problem of exposing 
jurors to such evidence in the first place and to eliminate the 
incentives that prosecutors currently have to find prejudicial evidence 
on defendants‘ habits. Such a rule would make the administration of 
justice more efficient and accurate.  
 
 86. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 87. The court in Curtin merely warned that ―[t]he use of lawful reading material to prove 
intent is a dangerous business, and any district court that considers admitting such evidence 
should carefully weigh both its relevance and the concerns embodies in Rule 403.‖ United 
States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 966 (9th Cir. 2007). One commentator has suggested that other 
circuits have better protected against unfair prejudice by guiding both district courts exercising 
discretion over these issues and prosecutors faced with role-playing defenses like Curtin‘s. 
Recent Case, Evidence—Relevance and Prejudice—Ninth Circuit Removes Bar on Admission of 
a Defendant’s Reading Material to Show Intent to Solicit a Minor, 121 HARV. L. REV. 652, 659 
nn.58–59 (2007) (citing United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(warning judges of the danger of prejudicial antipathy in a jury upon hearing evidence of gang 
membership); United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding unpersuasive a 
role-playing defense to charges of sexual exploitation of a minor, based on factual analysis)). 
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IV. PROPOSAL 
An amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence or the 
accompanying comments would provide a remedy to the troubling 
inconsistency resulting from trial court discretion to admit prejudicial 
reading-history evidence. Because Congress has recognized the 
importance of having dynamic standards, rather than static and 
inflexible mandates, govern federal courts, the Judicial Conference of 
the United States
88
 already is required by statute to ―carry on a 
continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of 
practice and procedure.‖89 
As a first step, a member of the Judicial Conference‘s Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
90
 should review the 
aforementioned case law and scholarly literature, as well as other 
empirical research and position papers on the dangers of the current 
inconsistency, and then should draft a proposed amendment to Rule 
404(b).
91
  
In the last decade, the Advisory Committee has rejected 
suggestions to shift toward ad hoc balancing of the probative value of 
hearsay evidence, opting to maintain the general exclusion.
92
 Against 
this backdrop, the proposed amendment likely will be deemed 
meritorious and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Rules of 
Evidence, thus bolstering the Advisory Committee‘s other endeavors 
to prevent unfair prejudice against criminal defendants and to limit 
the role of fact-finders to making probative determinations.  
 
 88. The Judicial Conference is headed by the Chief Justice of the United States and 
consists of the Chief Justice, the chief judge of each circuit court of appeals, a district judge 
from each regional circuit, and the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2073 (2000). The authority and procedures for promulgating rules are set forth in the Rules 
Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77. 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 331. The Committee is to recommend amendments and additions to rules 
based on the following criteria: promoting simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, 
the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.  
 90. The Advisory Committee is composed of judges, representatives from the United 
States Department of Justice, law professors, and practicing attorneys. 
 91. Most of the debate over admission of reading-history evidence at trials arises in the 
context of balancing the factors in Rule 404(b). See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 92. Recent Case, supra note 87, at 658 n.54 (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 
164 (1995)). 
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However, there is an argument that excluding reading-material 
evidence is a frivolous use of the Committee‘s time, and the 
significant step of amending the federal rules is unnecessary when 
individual judges already can and should exclude all unfairly 
prejudicial evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b). Moreover, the 
statutorily prescribed process for amending a Rule of Evidence is 
quite protracted and requires cooperation by state bar associations 
and legal scholars, as well as approval by both the Supreme Court 
and Congress.
93
 
However, the Advisory Committee should recognize that the 
status quo tacitly encourages jurors to convict seemingly immoral, 
dangerous, or unpopular defendants despite prosecutors‘ failure to 
prove the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
legislative reform proves infeasible, appellate courts must convey 
clear warnings
94
 to district courts exercising discretion on reading-
history evidence to consider the constitutional paradigms of assuring 
that all lawful ideas, even those repugnant to many societal norms, 
can be freely espoused.  
 
 93. After drafting the suggested amendment to exclude evidence of reading habits, the 
Advisory Committee must submit the rule for distribution to state bar associations, hold one or 
more public hearings, and provide a six month opportunity for members of the public to 
comment. Paul R. Rice, Federal Rules Decisions: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 
191 F.R.D. 678, 680–82 (2000).  
 Next, the Advisory Committee must submit the proposed amendment, along with a 
summary of any comments received, to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. Id. If the Standing Committee approves a proposed rule change, it will transmit the 
change to the Judicial Conference with a recommendation for approval, accompanied by the 
Advisory Committee‘s reports and the Standing Committee‘s own report explaining any 
modifications it made. Id. If the Standing Committee makes a modification that constitutes a 
substantial change from the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, the proposal normally 
will be returned to the Advisory Committee with appropriate instructions. Id.  
 The Judicial Conference, after approving amendments during its September session, 
recommends changes to the Supreme Court for approval. The Supreme Court must transmit 
proposed amendments to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the amendment is to take 
effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2074. Finally, Congress has a statutory period of at least seven months to 
review any rules and enact legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules. Rice, supra, at 682. 
 94. Decisions like Curtin move in the wrong direction by expanding unbridled discretion. 
Luckily, some district court judges will continue to exercise discretion wisely by strictly 
scrutinizing prosecutors‘ efforts to exploit defendants‘ First Amendment freedoms to access 
information.  
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CONCLUSION 
An explicit prohibition in the Federal Rules of Evidence against 
the admission of character evidence based on reading history would 
serve several practical functions. It would facilitate more accurate 
determinations of criminal guilt by juries who tend unknowingly to 
disregard limiting instructions and let nonconformity with social 
norms influence determinations of guilt. It would safeguard 
constitutional rights to privacy and free thought against increasing 
government and private surveillance of cognitive activity. Finally, it 
would replace the inconsistency of the current discretionary, ad hoc 
balancing test for admissibility with a test that promotes consistency 
among federal courts and similarly would compel state courts to 
amend their rules.  
By failing to safeguard the private act of consuming 
constitutionally protected information, courts have permitted jurors to 
consider reading history that shocks and offends sensibilities. But to 
do so diverts jurors‘ focus from the elements of the crime charged. 
Undoubtedly, defendants have paid a heavy price where perverse 
reading habits were unfairly determinative of serious criminal 
convictions. 
It may be easier for a prosecutor to portray a defendant as 
repulsive, but, given our commitment to universal civil liberties, we 
should exclude reading-history evidence and thereby require the 
government to respect defendants‘ cognitive rights. Prosecutors 
undoubtedly can rely on the multitude of other weapons in their 
arsenals to prove each case objectively, no matter how arduous.  
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